Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Manufacturing Consent

Documents suggest that in the years leading to 9/11, Taliban was not only willing to hand over Bin Laden to the US but also warned the latter of an impending terrorist attack
 
US administration documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and released by Washington based National Security Archive shed some additional light on talks with the Taliban preceding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It also underlines the constant Taliban offer to hand over Osama bin Laden; and the activity of Pakistan before and after the attacks.

As present-day US plan of action increasingly follows policies to conciliate or “flip” the Taliban, the document highlights Washington’s complete refusal to negotiate with Taliban immediately after 9/11. For example, on September 13, 2001, the then US Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin brusquely told President Pervez Musharraf that there was “absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban” and that the time for dialogue was “finished as of September 11.” However, Pakistan’s approach was more holistic and did not correspond to the American knee-jerk reaction. The then ISI chief N Mahmoud Ahmed told the ambassador not to act in anger. The real victory, he said, would come in negotiations and that if the Taliban were eliminated, Afghanistan would “revert to warlordism.” There are some interesting inputs on Osama as well. When asked about apprehending Laden, Mahmoud said it was “better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout.” He in fact travelled to Afghanistan twice, on September 17, aboard an American plane, and again on September 24, 2001 to talk over the gravity of situation with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. However, the US was hell bent on action. Chamberlin categorically let Mahmoud known that while his meetings were all right, but they “could not delay military planning.”

Subsequent papers underscore the value of the bilateral bond to leaders in both Pakistan and the US. An interesting memo categorized seven demands handed over to Mahmoud by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage just 48 hours after the attack. President Musharraf sent a cable a day after accepting all the demands “unconditionally”. However, the documents also reveal fundamental disagreements and distrust vis-a-vis Taliban.


Source : IIPM Editorial, 2012.
An Initiative of IIPM, Malay Chaudhuri
and Arindam Chaudhuri (Renowned Management Guru and Economist).

For More IIPM Info, Visit below mentioned IIPM articles

Posted by at
Labels: , , , , , , , , , , ,